Plutarch and Platonist Orthodoxy by Dillon, John
11
Plutarch and Platonist Orthodoxy*
JOHN DILLON
The question of the place of Plutarch within the Platonic School is still a
live one, but it has changed its nature somewhat in recent years, especially
in view of the successful demolition of the Platonic Academy as an
institution in his day,^ and the inevitable fall-out from that in terms of
positing a coherent doctrinal tradition within Platonism. The removal of
the actual institution which might maintain (or propound) orthodoxy does
not in itself, it would seem, dispose of the general concept of a Platonic
orthodoxy, the alternatives to which are necessarily "heresy" or
"eclecticism." Plutarch in his day has been accused of both of these
deviations. The concept of orthodoxy itself, then, and the standing of
Plutarch within the Platonic School, both still merit examination.
Plutarch's position in the Platonist tradition cannot be properly
evaluated, however, it seems to me, so long as the notion of an "orthodox"
Platonism is maintained, whether propounded by an official Platonic
Academy, or not. Heinrich Dorrie, in an article published in 1971,^before
Lynch and Glucker had published their books (with which, however, he
would not necessarily have agreed),^ distorts the position of Plutarch by
postulating something that he calls "Schulplatonismus," which he sees
represented by such figures as Taurus in Athens, and Albinus in Smyrna
(Plutarch's teacher Ammonius he is not too sure about, op. cit. p. 36, n. 1).
But in fact we have no indication that there was in Athens at this time—let
This article originated in a talk to be given to the Pluurch Conference held in Athens in
June 1987, but not delivered then. It will appear also, in slightly different form, as an essay,
"Orthodoxy and Eclecticism in Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism," in The Question of
Ecleclicism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, ed. J. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley and
Us Augeles 1988) 103-25.
' I refer to the works of John Lynch. Aristotle's School (Berkeley and Los Augeles 1972), and
John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy, (Gottingen 1978).
^"Die Stellung Plutarchs im Platonismus seiner Zeit," in Philomathes: Studies and Essays
in Memory of PhUip Merlan, ed. R. Palmer and R. Hamerlon-KeUy (The Hague 1971) 36-56.
^We wiU see before long what he felt about this, when the later volumes of his history of
Platonism, Der Platonismus in Antike (Vol. I, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadl 1987), appear.
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us say, 70 to 120 A.D.—anything like a "regular" Platonic School for
Plutarch to be contrasted with.''
John Glucker has done us the great service of "re-drawing the map" of
Middle Platonism,^ showing that what we are deaUng with in the period after
about 80 B.C. is no more than a series of individual teachers, in various
centres, including Athens, but also Alexandria and the great cities of Asia
Minor, identified as Platonists, and bound to the tradition (and to varying
extents to each other) through their own teachers, who were in turn
dependent on their teachers. To this extent only did the "Golden Chain" of
Platonic philosophy continue during this period. Individual philosophers
knew whether they were Platonists or not So did their pupils, and so did
the general public. The ancient Mediterranean intellectual 61ite was a small
world, by modem standards.
It is strange, therefore, that Glucker should boggle,^ even to the extent
that he does, at certain admittedly troublesome remarks which Plutarch
makes about the Academy in the course of his writings.'' In a well-known
passage of the dialogue On the E at Delphi (387F), for example, Plutarch
describes himself as "devoting myself to mathematics with the greatest
enthusiasm, although I was destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim
'Nothing to Excess', when once I had come to be in the Academy (ev
'AKaSriiieia yevonevoi;)." This to me certainly indicates a recognition by
Plutarch of a period in his intellectual development when he would not have
described himself as being in the Academic tradition, but rather, perhaps—to
judge from the context —as a Pythagorean. The context, after all, is that
one Eustrophus of Athens (whom Plutarch seems here to claim as a
particular associate^), utters a very Pythagorean encomium (388E), first, of
Number in general (as the basis and first principle of all things divine and
human), and then of the number Five in particular, to which Plutarch
himself assents enthusiastically (einov ouv KdA,A,ioTa xov Euo-cpocpov tS
dpi,0|j,a) X\)Z\\ TTiv dnopiotv, 387F).
* The Epicurean, and perhaps the Stoic, Schools seem to have survived into the second century
A.D. (evidence usefully assembled by Glucker, op. cit. pp. 364-73), but there is no comparable
trace of a definitive Platonic (or Peripatetic) School. Rather, there were, if anything, a
multipUcity of them (in Athens, Alexandria, Smyrna, and so on), each with their own diadochoi,
possessing a precarious continuity for a generation or so, and not aspiring to any exclusive
orthodoxy, though naturally all feeling themselves to be part of the intellectual "succession."
'To borrow a phrase of his from his review of my book The Middle Platonists in CR 30
(1980)58.
^Antiochus and the Late Academy, ch. 6, 256-80.
'Particularly, De. £ J87F; Def. Or. 431A; De Sera 549E; Quaest. Conv. DC 12, 741C; De
Facie 922F.
*This I take to be the significance of the rather coy sutement (388F) xauxa ttpoi; rmou;
eXeYEv ov) TiaiCmv 6 Evaxpocpoc;, gXK' SM^ triviKawta TtpooEKeinTiv xoi? (laOtJuaaiv
EnnaSa^, K.T.X.
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Now Glucker takes the phrase ev 'Aica6Ti|iEia yevo^evoi; to mean that
at the time of this conversation Plutarch, although already a pupil of
Ammonius, did not regard himself as yet being "in the Academy." Since
he, like me, does not wish to postulate a philosophic institution of that
name, he is forced to the desperate suggestion—which, as he says (p. 271),
he offers "not without compunction"—that somehow Plutarch means by
this, joining the Academy as a gymnasium, in connection with serving as
an ephebe (which foreigners could certainly do early in the next century, at
least), and that a reverence for the more sceptical traditions of the Academy
could have resulted from this.
But I do not see that the phrase must be construed in such a way as to
imply that Plutarch did not then yet see himself as "in the Academy." The
force of the participle may after all be quasi-concessive, i.e. "although I was
destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim 'Nothing to Excess', seeing
as I had now joined the Academy," or "such as was proper for one who had
joined the Academy." It is plain, after all, from Ammonius' own remarks
that he regards Pythagorean numerology with considerable irony. Plutarch,
as a new member of "the Academy," has not at this stage (66-67 A.D.) yet
moderated his youthful enthusiasm for it.
I must apologise for dwelling so long on such a detail, in what is after
all almost a private argument with my good friend Glucker, but this is a
potentially troublesome passage, which, yet, correctly interpreted (as I hope
it now has been), is of considerable interest for our picture of Plutarch's
intellectual development and standing within Platonism.
One other aspect of this passage (and of some others, such as those
listed in n. 7 above) is important, however, and that is Plutarch's attitude to
Academic scepticism. As we know, later Platonists, after Antiochus of
Ascalon, could, and did, take one of two possible altitudes to the New
Academy and its philosophical methods. The one was to condemn it as a
deviation from true Platonism, a view propounded forcefully by Antiochus
himself, in his dialogue Sosus^ (and doubtless elsewhere), and developed
eloquently and amusingly by Numenius in his polemical treatise On the
Unfaithfulness of the Academy to Plato;^^ the other was to accept the view
of Antiochus' predecessor Philo of Larisa that the Academic tradition was
one and unbroken, with at most a difference of emphasis manifested in the
New Academy." This was certainly the line taken by Cicero, and also by
' As reported in Cicero, Acad. Pr. 1 1 ff.
'0 Fit. 23-28 Des Places.
" Philo himself is possibly the source of what is no doubt a pious fiction, certainly
widespread in later Platonism (cf. Sextus Emp. PH I 234), that "The New Academy had a habit
of concealing their opinions, and did not usually disclose them to anyone except those that had
lived with them right up to old age" (Aug. Contr. Acad. 3. 20. 43, quoting a lost part of Cicero's
Academica).
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Plutarch, though in neither case does this make them sceptics to any serious
dcgrecP
Undoubtedly Plutarch had an interest, and a sympathetic interest, in the
New Academy. The works of his that would exhibit this most clearly,
unfortunately, are all lost, but from their titles we can learn a certain
amount. On the Unity of the Academy since Plato (Lamprias Cat. 63)
places him firmly in the tradition of Philo of Larisa; On the Difference
between the Pyrrhonians and the Academics (ibid. 64) presumably argued
that the Academy had a positive doctrine behind its scepticism, or at least
that their scepticism was not complete.'^ On the other hand, the essays That
there is no such thing as Understanding (auviEvai) (158) and Whether he
who suspends judgement (6 enexcov) on everything is condemned to
inaction (210) sound distinctly sympathetic to Scepticism, and that On
Pyrrho's Ten Tropes (158) probably was so also.
In the surviving works, too, we have a number of passages indicating
that Plutarch accepted a view of the Platonic tradition which included the
New Academy. At De Facie 922F, for example, he allows the Stoic
Phamaces to reproach his brother Lamprias as follows:
"Here we are faced with that stock manoeuvre (to jtepiaKTOv) of the
Academy; on each occasion that they engage in discourse with others they
will not offer any accounting of their own assertions but must keep their
interlocutors on the defensive lest they become the prosecutors."
Lamprias has just been satirising the Stoic theory of the moon's substance.
Such complaints go back, of course, to the interlocutors of Socrates,^''but
we may still take this, I think, as a good indication that Plutarch recognises
New Academic methods of argument as a proper part of a Platonist's
armoury.
On the other hand, Lamprias goes on to present a positive theory as to
the moon's composition, which serves to show that Plutarch draws on the
"Socratic" tradition of elenchus primarily as a weapon in inter-school
controversy, not as an integral part of this philosophical method, which was
predominantly expository and dogmatic.
He makes use of the Academic tradition of "suspending judgement"
also, I suspect, when he wants to save himself the trouble of going into
questions of physical philosophy deeper than he wants to (very much like
Cicero before him). An instance of this is his remark at the end of his short
'^ For Cicero, see now the useful discussion of Stephen Genh, in Middle Platonism and
Neoplalonism. The Latin Tradition, Vol. I, 58-63, and for Plutarch, Phillip de Lacy's "Plutarch
and the Academic Sceptics," CJ 49 (1953-54), 79-85.
" As against Aenesidemus, for example, who certainly wished to claim Plato and probably
the New Academics, as Sceptics. We find the counterpart to this essay in Sextus Empiricus P.
H. I. 220-35, his chapter "How Scepticism Differs from the Academic Philosophy."
'* E.g. Thrasymachus in Rep. I 366C, and Hippias in Xen. Mem. TV 4. 9.
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essay On the Principle of Cold (955A)—addressed, significantly enough, to
the sophist Favorinus, who professed Academic scepticism:
"Compare these statements, Favorinus, with the pronouncements of others,
and if these notions of mine are neither deficient nor much superior in
plausibility {n\.Qa\/6zr\c,) to those of others, say farewell to dogmas
(56^ai), being convinced as you are that it is more philosophical to
suspend judgement (enexeiv) when the truth is obscure than to come to
conclusions (ovYKaxaTi6ecj6ai)."
(Trans. Helmbold, slightly emended)
All this, however, concerns Plutarch's attitude to Scepticism and the allied
question of the unity of the Academy. There is a good deal more to the
problem of orthodoxy than that, and it is to some of these other areas that
we must now turn.
The only place where we find Plutarch setting himself explicitly against
what could be regarded as the "orthodox" Platonist position is in his treatise
On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus, and it is interesting to observe
how he phrases his opposition. Pace Dorrie (op. cit. p. 48), he does not
present himself as taking on a Platonist "establishment." He recognises
that he is going against the views of all, or at least "the most highly
regarded" (o'l SoKincora-uoi avSpei;, 1012D), of previous commentators, but
he does not view those commentators as a homogeneous group. Though all
choose to deny that the world was created at a point in time (101 3A), some
are followers of Xenocrates' view, and others of that of Grantor, while
others, like Eudorus, seek to reconcile both views, and he deals with each of
them in turn. Nor does he speak here as an outsider attacking the
establishment, but as the true interpreter of Plato's doctrine correcting the
mistakes of predecessors: "Such being the whole of what they say . . . to
me they both seem to be utterly mistaken about Plato's opinion, if a
standard of plausibility is to be used, not in promotion of one's own
doctrines, but with a desire to say something that agrees with Plato"
(1013B, trans. Chemiss).
It may seem to us that promoting his own doctrines in the guise of an
exegesis of the Timaeus is precisely what Plutarch himself is doing, but
that is not, plainly, how he sees it. Elsewhere, in his treatise On Moral
Virtue, though his position of hospitality to Aristotelian ethical doctrine
might be considered almost as controversial, we find no suggestion that he
has any consciousness of this. His polemic is all with outsiders, chiefly the
Stoics. And yet there is much that is peculiar in his doctrine here.
One of Plutarch's most distinctive doctrines, apart from his well-known
dualism (though closely involved with it), is his view of the soul as
essentially (avTTi Ka9' eav-criv) non-rational (Proc. an. 1014DE), and
distinct from intellect. It is this essential soul that he sees in the "nature
divided about bodies" of Timaeus 35A, and in the "maleficent soul" of Laws
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10, and it is the cornerstone of his theory in the Proc. an. It also figures in
the treatise On Moral Virtue}^
At the outset (440D), Plutarch raises the question, "what is the
essential nature ipusia) of moral virtue, and how does it arise; and whether
that part of the soul which receives it is equipped with its own reason
(logos), or merely shares in one alien to it; and if the latter, whether it does
this after the manner of things which are mingled with something better, or
rather, whether it is said to participate in the potency {dynamis) of the ruling
element through submitting to its administration and governance."
Here, admittedly, he speaks of a part (morion) of the soul, rather than of
soul in general, but it becomes plain presently that what he has in mind is
not really the lower or "passionate" soul in the traditional Platonic sense, so
much as soul distinct from intellect. A little further on, in the course of his
introductory survey of previous opinion, he criticizes those, particularly the
Stoics, who assume intellect and soul to be a unity:
"It seems to have eluded all these philosophers in what way each of us is
truly two-fold and composite. For that other two-fold nature of ours they
have not discerned, but merely the more obvious one, the blend of soul and
body."
Pythagoras, on the other hand, and above all Plato, recognized "that
there is some element of composition, some two-fold nature and
dissimilarity of the very soul within itself, since the irrational, like an alien
body, is mingled and joined with reason (logos) by some compulsion of
nature."'^ Here he speaks, rather misleadingly, of the two-fold nature of "the
very soul within itself," but we can take it, I think, that he is using "soul"
in a loose sense, as those who have not discerned the true situation would
use it. The truth, as we see, is that there are three entities, body, soul, and
nous (intellect) and this trichotomy leaves soul as essentially and of itself
alogos, non-rational, though having a part which is receptive of reason
(441Fff.).
In the Virt. mor., it must be admitted, Plutarch obscures the doctrine
which he presents very plainly in the Proc. an., by speaking, for the most
part, of the "non-rational part" (alogon meros) of the soul, rather than the
soul itself, as opposed to nous, and it is possible that he has not yet fully
clarified his position in his own mind (if, as I assume, the Virt. mor. is
earlier than the Proc. an.), but he says enough, I think, to show that this
'^ Plutarch's doctrine of the soul has recently been excellently set out in the useful study of
Werner Dense, Unlersuchungen zur millelplalonischen und neuplalonischen Seelenlehre
(Wiesbaden 1983) 12-47, though Deuse does not pay as much attention to the Virl. mor. as he
should have, confining himself largely to Proc. an. and De Is. el Osir.
'* Helmbold's Loeb trans., slightly emended.
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remarkable doctrine was already in his mind.'"' What is interesting for our
present purpose is that he shows no consciousness of "unorthodoxy" on this
point, as he does on the matter of the temporal creation of the world
(though, as I have said earlier, "unorthodoxy" is not quite the right word).
The other notable aspect of the treatise On Moral Virtue, of course, is
its wholehearted adoption of Aristotelian doctrine, derived directly from the
Nicomachean Ethics, chiefly Books 2. 5-7 (On the Mean) and 6 (on
Akrasia), with some influence also from the De anima}^ This can be
labelled eclecticism, but I do not see that that term is very useful. It is clear
from his presentation of Aristotle's position at 442B-C that Plutarch regards
him as substantially adopting Plato's doctrine of the soul (except that he
"later" assigned the "spirited" past ithymoeides) unequivocally to the
irrational part of the soul—a development which Plutarch does not quarrel
with). This enables Plutarch to present, for instance, the theory of the
Mean (in 444C-445A) unhesitatingly as Platonic doctrine.
Although the chief source of his doctrine here, as I have said, is
Nicomachean Ethics 2. 5-7, there are some elements observable, modifying
the Aristotelian position, which, once again, might misleadingly be termed
"eclectic." First of all, Aristotle describes Virtue as a hexis or state
(1 106b36), but Plutarch, at 444F, describes it as a "movement" (kinesis)
and "power" (dynamis) concerned with the management of the irrational, and
doing this by fine tuning and harmonising of its discordant excesses (cf.
444E, 445C). This seems a Pythagorizing turn of phrase, and that, together
with the laudatory mention of Pythagoras in the doxography (441E), points
to a Pythagorean element in the mix which Plutarch is presenting to us.
This Pythagoreanism can be shown with fair certainty to be mediated
through Posidonius, by a comparison with Galen, De plac. Hipp, et Plat. 4.
7. 39 (p. 290 De Lacy) and 5. 6. 43 (p. 334 De Lacy),'' but Plutarch's
interest in Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism is well enough attested apart
from this^" to make it probable that he is not simply dependent on
Posidonius here. Further, the activity of virtue is described as a
"harmonising" (synharmoga) of the irrational by the rational soul in a
'^ Even in the midst of his exposition of the doctrine in the Defacie {943D) he refers to those
who have made TTi<; yvxfi? to aXoyov Kai to TtaGrixiKov orderly and amenable to their
X6yo<;, using traditional terminology.
See on this the useful discussion of D. Babut, in pp. 44-54 of the Introduction to his
edition of the work, Plutarque, De la vertu ithique (Paris 1969). He refutes satisfactorily earlier
attempts to postulate Posidonius or Andronicus of Rhodes as intermediaries for the doctrine of
this part of the work, though the anti-Stoic polemic of the second part (from 446E on) does
show dependence on Posidonius (as reported in Galen, De. plac. Hipp, et Plat. 4). His view,
with which I concur, is that Plutarch read Aristotle for himself, though he was doubtless
acquainted with later Peripatetic works as well.
'' Quoted by Babut in his notes ad loc.
^E.g. Is. et Osir. 360D; 384A; Proc. an. 1027F; 1020E ff. Quaes!, conv. 8.7 and 8; De. E
388C. etc.
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variety of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha,^' which indicates a tendency in many
of these works to claim Aristotelian ethical theory for Pythagoras.
Metopos' treatise On Virtue (pp. 116-21 Thesleff) is a good example of this
(he also produces the formulation, found at the beginning of Virt. mor.
(440D), that the passions are the "matter" (hyle) of ethical virtue, p. 119.
8). While not being necessarily dependent on any of these intermediate
sources for his interpretation of Aristotle, therefore, Plutarch was doubtless
aware of most of them.
If this is eclecticism, it is certainly not mindless eclecticism. It is
based on a view of the history of philosophy, mistaken perhaps, but
perfectly coherent, which sees Plato as a follower of Pythagoras, and
Aristotle as essentially still a Platonist, and a consistent ethical position
being held by all three. As to the doctrine of the distincmess of soul and
intellect, which does not, as I say, receive clear articulation in this treatise,
but comes out clearly in the dialogues On the Face of the Moon (943A ff.),
and On the Daemon of Socrates (591D ff.), as well as in the Proc. an., that
is a piece of "unorthodoxy," on the origins of which I have speculated
elsewhere, though without definite conclusions,^^ but it is one for which
Plutarch is at pains to find Platonic antecedents (e.g. Tim. 30B; 90A,
Phaedr. 247C; Laws 12, 961D; 966D-E), and which, as I have said, he does
not regard as setting him in opposition to any official Platonic tradition.^^
In summary, Plutarch may be a bit of a maverick, but he does not view
himself as such (except perhaps in the matter of temporal creation), and I
can see no evidence of any contemporary "Schulplatonismus" from which he
can be said to deviate.
Trinity College, Dublin
^' Archytas, 11. vonou Kal 5ikoioo«vt1(;, p. 33. 17, Thesleff {Pythagorean Texts);
Metopos, n. dperfi?, p. 119. 27; Theages 11. apE'rii;, p. 190. 1 ff.
^The Middle Plalonisls 211-14. A similar distinction is made in some treatises of the
Corpus Hermeticum (notably 1 and X), and it is analogous to the distinction in Gnostic thought
between soul and pneuma, but 1 am uncertain what to conclude from this. Attributing the
doctrine to Posidonius, in defauh of any hard evidence, is a once easy option no longer open, I
think.
^ At De facie 943A, he criticises oi noXXoi for wrongly believing man to be composed of
just two parts, but these "many" need not be regarded as any set of philosophers, never mind
Platonist philosophers.
